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I
TI CURRENT ISSUES OVER PUBLIC AIDs IN DOMESTIC TRANSPORT
In the United States, government shares with private enterprise the risks and costs
of providing transport supply in a mixed system of public and private enterprise.
In general, although a variety of promotional devices have been used, government
furnishes the basic ways (and terminals in some cases), while private carriers supply
the equipment, organization, and working capital essential to carrier operations over
public facilities. This mixed enterprise is characteristic of air, highway, and water
transport, but not of pipeline and railway transport, fields in which private enterprise
accepts the responsibility of providing both way and carrier facilities. As most coun-
tries operate their railways under public enterprise, this country's particular mix of
private and public enterprise in transport is unique.
As a broad generalization, one that subsequently must be qualified in important
respects, it can be said that the American system of mixed enterprise in transport
(with its relatively heavy emphasis on private enterprise) has worked tolerably well.
It has produced a fully-developed, large-scale, multi-service, and essentially competi-
tive transport system that appears the envy of most countries. However, Europeans
often question whether automobiles and expressways can ever, by themselves, pro-
vide a solution for urban congestion, and observers from underdeveloped countries
wonder how a country can afford the large amount of route and agency duplication
involved in the American transport system.
Nevertheless, the American policy of directly providing basic facilities, such as
airways and inland waterways, and of financially aiding the states to furnish airport
and highway facilities has not escaped severe and widespread internal criticism.
Today, almost no one questions the desirability of public spending for the airways,
airports, highways, and waterways. But increasingly the question has been raised
whether it is economically desirable to furnish any of the carrier groups with the
ways and terminals they require entirely free of charge, as in the case of inland
waterways, or at user charges that may be inadequate to cover all relevant resource
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costs involved in rendering way or terminal services to carriers. Stated more pointed-
ly, the critical questions are: Is there a continuing economic justification for the
grant of subsidies to certain or all of the classes of carriers that depend on public
transport facilities? Is it now feasible to have the full economic advantages that
the American mixed system of transport can yield, while assessing appropriate user
charges against all carriers using public way and terminal facilities? If the differ-
ential grant of subsidies is continued along with other questionable policies, what
will be the ultimate social costs in terms of loss of essential and efficient transport
plant not receiving the benefit of public subsidy? Specifically, is the deteriorating
condition of the privately-owned railroads during a long period of postwar prosperity
attributable to any important extent to the direct and indirect subsidies given the
expanding transport agencies that rely on public facilities as essential plant for their
vehicular operations?
These issues are not new in American transport. But as the aggregate volumes
of annual public investment in airway, airport, highway, and waterway facilities have
been expanding rapidly, while railway investment has lagged, they have become
more urgent, and the day has drawn closer when reasonable solutions must be found.
Rightly or wrongly, many observers have arrived at the conclusion that a connection
exists between the rising levels of public expenditures for alternative transport facili-
ties (including the generous terms quoted to carriers for their use) and the high and
rising level of rail freight rates, the recurring shortages of freight cars, the decisions
of prominent eastern railroads to disinvest in basic line capacity, the rising passenger
deficits, and the worrisome discontinuance of commutation train services.' At any
rate, the enactment of the Transportation Act of 1958 2 was concrete evidence of the
growing public concern over the long-term consequences of the declining position of
the railroads. It also reflects the underlying issue whether railway decline represents
ordinary technological substitution bringing superior service, lower costs, and more
adequate transport supply for the needs of commerce as a whole, or whether it
represents an uneconomic consequence of overexpanded government investment in
transport facilities, subsidies to some competing agencies but not to others, and regu-
1 The concentration of this article on the problem of transport subsidies should not be construed to
imply that it is the writer's view that the long-term and postwar relative decline of the railroads is
wholly or even principally due to the effects of subsidies to air, highway, and water transport. Of course,
other reasons exist for much of the huge traffic diversions from the railroads in recent years, such as the
long-standing inadequacies of rail pricing in relation to rail unit costs and competitive conditions, the
restrictive effect of regulation on competitive rate making, superior service by air and motor carriers, and
lower unit costs (even with government subsidies figured in) for some hauls and services. For a full
statement of the basic elements in railway decline, see JAMiEs C. NELSON, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1959). Cf. JOHN R. MEYER, MERTON J. PEcx, JOHN STENASON, & CHARLES ZwicK, Tui
ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 65-85, 122-26, 139-44, 148, 166.96,
238-52, 265-69 (1959).
272 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1231-40 (Supp. 1958). See also Senate Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, Transportation Act of 1958, S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Transportation Act of z958, H.R. REP. No. 1922, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (958). S. Res. 303, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CoNG. REC. 8370 (1958), authorized
the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee to investigate a number of transport policy
questions, including public aids and user charges for public transport facilities.
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latory policies preventing or slowing the market and price adjustments of the rail-
roads to the growing competition which they face (and which is in prospect) from
alternative agencies differentially enjoying the benefits of government provision of
their ways and/or terminal facilities.
The problem of subsidies in transport is far too vast and complicated for full
statistical treatment in this article. This discussion is limited to viewing the subject
in general terms in the light of present-day conditions, rather than to presenting a
complete historical and quantitative account, such as was done two decades or so
ago by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation and the Board of Investigation
and Research.3 Special attention will be given to ascertaining whether it makes
economic sense to continue traditional areas of subsidy to some transport agencies
more or less indefinitely, and whether it is now feasible for the federal government
to adopt a policy of universal user fees. Throughout, the long-term economics of
the subject will be stressed, rather than the acquisitive, regional, or income-distribu-
tional effects of subsidies. The basic assumption made is that the objective of national
transport policy, to be economic, must be to encourage the development of a trans-
port system capable of minimizing the total costs in scarce resources required for
producing continuously and adequately the mix of transport services demanded at
prices that are closely related to the costs of supplying those services. Hence, public
aids will be discussed in terms of their contribution or lack of contribution to that
over-all objective.
II
THE HISTORICAL POLICY OF PUBLIC AIDS To TRANSPORT
With the exception of the pipelines, all domestic transport agencies and the
American shipping lines and airlines in international commerce have received sub-
sidies from government at some time during their development. It will, there-
fore, be instructive to note the kinds of aids granted, the purposes established for-
them, the conditions attached, and the resulting social gains achieved.
During the nineteenth century, certain western and southern railroads were
beneficiaries of federal land grants (and of other state and federal aids), extended to
encourage initial construction of rail lines into areas without efficient transport service
and into virgin western regions; in return, the land-grant railroads were obligated
to quote land-grant rate reductions for transportation of mail, troops, and govern-
'See FEDERAL COORDINATOR oF TRANSPORTATION, PUBLIC AIDS TO TRANSPORTATION (938-4o); Board
of Investigation and Research, Public Aids to Domestic Transportation, H.R. Doc. No. 159, 7 9th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1945); Board of Investigation and Research, A Report on Carrier Taxation, H.R. Doc. No. x6o,,
79th Cong., ist Sess. (1945). The terms "subsidy" and "public aid" are used interchangeably to mean
both the grant of money and the provision of facilities or services by government without requiring fully
compensatory payments. Public expenditures for transport facilities do not necessarily result in public-
aids or subsidies; they do, however, to -the extent that uncompensated costs result from a complete lack
of user fees, from inadequate user charges, or from grants of money or land that are not repayable..
See Board of Investigation and Research, Public Aids to Domestic Transportation, H.R. Doc. No. 159,.
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-55 (EM)-
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ment property (an obligation that continued until October 1, 1946) . Earlier, canals
had been constructed by state agencies and furnished to water carriers at tolls de-
signed to recover capital and operating costs; however, since about 188o, by which
time the railroads had largely superseded the canals, the federal and state govern-
ments have provided improved waterways to the barge lines entirely free of user
charges, except on the recently completed St. Lawrence Seaway, an international
facility. Even earlier, private turnpikes supplied improved main highways on a
commercial basis; but since the decline of turnpikes after 1850, the provision of high-
ways has been the responsibility of the state and local governments, with the federal
government granting ever-increasing aid (since 1916) for construction of limited-
federal-aid systems of state, municipal, and county highways.' However, almost
from the beginning of the modern highway movement around the turn of this
century, motor vehicle owners have been assessed user fees (registration fees at first,
and then motor fuel and other special taxes) for use of the public highways.
Finally, the federal government undertook to provide the civil airways in the
early days of air transport, and even today furnishes the airways to aircraft operators
without explicit user fees (although an excise tax of two cents a gallon on aviation
gasoline is paid to the federal government). And for many years, federal air-mail
subsidies have been awarded to the domestic and international airlines, although
they no longer are given to the domestic trunk lines which carry a very large pro-
portion of the traffic. In addition, local government, with federal aid, furnishes
essential airport facilities, assessing the airlines user charges that, however, have not
been sufficient, along with other sources of airport revenues, to make public airports
self-supporting enterprises.
Over the years, tremendous sums have been spent by government in making way
and terminal facilities available for use by private carriers, in giving direct subsidies
to certain classes of carriers, and in engaging in expensive scientific research and
development for national security-one result of which has been that much valuable
technology has become available to the air carriers without their having to finance
other than the cost of its adaptation to civil aviation.7
In a study recently published by the Brookings Institution, the present writer
estimated that the aggregate federal spending (of which only a part represented
subsidies) for air, highway, and water facilities and services (not adjusted for changes
'For a brief review of state and federal aids to the railroads, including federal land grants during
1850-71, see D. PHILIP LoczKLN, ECoNOMICs OF TRANSPORTATION 100-19 (1954); Henry, The Railroad
Land Grant Legend in American History'Texts, 32 Miss. VAL. HiSr. Rav. 171 (94.5). The reduced-rate
obligation continued until it was repealed by the Congress in 1946; by that action, the Congress recog-
nized that more than full compensation'had been made for the federal grants of land to certain railroads.
The total of all land-grant rate reductions (including voluntary equalization of rates by competing roads)
to June 30, 1943, was estimated to be $58o,ooo,ooo, a sum several times the value of the granted land
at the time land grants were awarded and in excess of the sums derived by the railroads from the grants.
' LocKLiN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 75-87, 75o-68.
' NresoN, op. cit. supra note r, at 93-107.,
"Statement of Burton N. Behling, in "Railroad Passenger Train Deficit, No. 31954, ICC, Feb.
18, 1958, pp. 7-16.
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in the value of the dollar) amounted to $43,ooooooooo through fiscal 1958. That
total included the $I6,9oooooooo of expenditures for the merchant marine for
emergency ship construction during two world wars and for mail or construction and
operating differential subsidies. Without that component for international shipping
facilities and services, total federal expenditures for domestic transport facilities
amounted to $26,xoo,ooo,ooo through fiscal 1958. Of that total, the greatest amount,
$I7,50O,ooo,ooo, went for highway development; the second largest amount, $5,400,-
ooo,ooo, for inland waterway development (excluding $95,7oo,ooo expended for the
St. Lawrence Seaway); and the third largest amount, $3,2oo,oooooo, for civil airways
and airports and for mail subsidies to air carriers! In addition, expenditures for
highways by state and local governments in recent decades have greatly exceeded the
total federal aid for highways, and probably even the aggregate federal expenditures
for all types of civil transport facilities. In contrast, total federal grants to the rail-
roads, in large part the value of granted land, amounted to only $I,4oo,ooo,oooY
The national purposes for giving financial assistance in behalf of transport
development are relevant in any evaluation of that policy. Clearly, grants to the
railroads had the somewhat unique national objective of initially stimulating settle-
ment and use of the undeveloped lands in the West by means of rapid introduc-
tion of a new transport technique capable of substantially reducing the cost of long-
distance transport and of improving the speed of service. On the other hand, most
merchant-marine expenditures have been for the purpose of increasing the supply of
ships for military needs during World Wars I and II and of maintaining, during
peace periods, sufficient merchant ships, shipbuilding and repair facilities, and trained
personnel for any military eventualities that might arise. Aids to air transport sought
to improve postal communication and to hasten the introduction of a new means of
transport capable of unique speeds of service, as well as to assure adequate equip-
ment, aircraft-manufacturing facilities, and skilled personnel for national defense.
Federal aid to highways had as its principal purposes the improvement of rural postal
services and the promotion of interstate commerce through stimulating competitive
transport; in addition, there has always been an underlying national defense interest
in a highly developed system of interstate highways based on the needs of com-
merce and, therefore, generally adequate for the needs of the military in time of war.
State and local investment in modern highways has largely been in response to the
way-service demands of a rapidly multiplying ownership of motor vehicles, as the
willingness of user groups to pay user fees and a growing proportion of total high-
way costs attests. The principal objectives for federal channelization of the inland
waterways, including the no-toll policy, have been to give some landlocked areas
8 NELsoN, op. cit. supra note i, at 67-71. It is recognized that price levels have changed and
that population and traffic have grown during -te century since the land grants were awarded certain
railroads to encourage construction. It is also recognized that comparison of the ratios of public expendi-
tures and grants for transport facilities to gross national product at different historical periods might be
pertinent.
9 CHAR..s L. DEAmNO & WLp.v OwEN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION PoLicy iI (1949).
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(principally the Mississippi Valley) lower freight rates than the railroads would
otherwise have quoted (even under ICC regulation) and to furnish additional
competition against the pre-i93o monopoly power of the railroads; and as in the case
of the other agencies, there was also some military interest in having these supple-
mentary facilities in time of war?
Except in the special case of the merchant marine, the over-all historical record
indicates that perhaps the strongest motive for federal transport subsidies has been to
bring about more rapidly than otherwise would occur the economic and social
benefits of improvements in transport service and lowered transport costs when
entirely new transport technology became available. This was true of federal aids
for highway and air-transport development. That objective was also a prominent
reason for the land grants to certain railroads decades ago, but with the significant
difference that a century ago far greater emphasis was necessarily placed on land
settlement and general economic development of the vast resources of pioneering
areas. The introduction and rapid expansion of modern air, highway, and waterway
transport came after a complete and efficient railway system had been established by
private capital, with some reimbursable aid (land-grant rate reductions) from the
government, and long after the railroads had already opened up most of the remote
and undeveloped regions of this country for rapid settlement and population growth.
It follows that the public aids given to the newer forms of transport have largely
been premised on improving transport with service innovations and through pro-
moting additional competition. This is not to say that public promotion of airways
and airports, highways, and waterways did not somewhat expand the extensive
margins of land use nor contribute to national economic growth. It rather implies that
the basic problem has long ago changed from the establishment for the first time
of a superior means of transport over wide areas in order to promote general economic
development, to the problem of assisting in the introduction of new modes of transport
as they appeared on the scene, with the purpose of refining the existing well-developed
system with new services, coordinated transport, and in some traffic areas with less
costly service in terms of resource costs. In other words, the grant of subsidies to air,
highway, and waterway transport was intended to speed the development of those
modes over the normal rate which market demand would in time have stimulated,
in order that the economy might earlier enjoy the benefits of new types of services,
new technologies of transport, and competitive transport organization.
According to some authorities, federal transport promotion has achieved good
long-term results on the whole. 1 Thus, grants to the railroads stimulated a rapid
spatial development in the nineteenth century by encouraging efficient regional
specialization on the basis of reductions in transport costs and improvements in serv-
5 0 1d. at 12, 81-94, 236-65. It should be pointed out that students of transport have long recognized
that subsidized waterways cannot be an effective regulator of rdilroad rates generally; and that while
such "'free" improvements confer.- advantages on some otherwise landlocked areas, they discriminate
against landlocked areas which have no access to waterways, actual or potential.
' Id. at 12-13.
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ice much earlier than would otherwise have occurred. Federal aid to highways fos-
tered a rapid and high development of the principal interstate highway routes
(along with a large mileage of highways of lesser significance in recent years); it
also induced early adoption of scientific highway management and planned highway
development. Although the contribution of motor transport to the economy is
harder to evaluate than that of the railroads, the steady emergence of competitive
transport markets after about 1920 is one of the most noteworthy contributions
of motor transport and modern highways. Air transport, whose amazing growth has
clearly been expedited by the pioneering government operation of the original air-
lines,12 government provision of airways and airports, the grant of air-mail sub-
sidies, and by strong federal regulation of airline safety standards, has also added
competitive elements in transport. However, air transport's chief contribution has
been its tremendous speed of service, benefiting postal communication, travel, and
the shipment of high-grade commodities alike. This century's waterway de'velop-
ment has added additional competitive elements and has given the particular areas
favored with waterways a low-priced but subsidized service for bulk and special
commodities.
Both the subsidies to the merchant marine and those given to commercial air
transport have contributed importantly to the supply of facilities, equipment, and
trained personnel that have been critically needed in recent wars. However, although
national defense needs may justify continuing subsidies to maintain a merchant
marine larger than the commercial market would supply, it cannot be overlooked
that without such subsidies, the privately-owned railroads and pipelines (including
the government-constructed Big Inch and Little Big Inch lines, now in private
ownership) also made highly significant contributions to essential transport supply
during World War II. The intercity highway carriers played a lesser but important
role in the war effort, even though they had long been required by the states to
make substantial user fee contributions in support of the public facilities over which
their vehicles operate. Accordingly, a significant conclusion to be drawn from
history is that when domestic transport agencies have been in adequate supply for
the normal needs of commerce, their capacity has also generally been sufficient for
wartime and defeAse needs, although some special coordination and rationing in
terms of wartime essentiality criteria and some minor adjustments in supply to
accommodate special defense needs have been required. The contribution of the
domestic transport industries to wartime economies indicates that, aside from the
case for subsidies to encourage the initial development of brand new modes of
transport, or for action to overcome an unbalanced development of transport facili-
ties due to the effects of public policies, there is no need for continuing subsidies to
any domestic field of transport in order to have adequate facilities for military needs.'8
1 2 JosEpH L. NICHOLSO.N, AIR TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT 7-18 (1955).
Cf. Harbeson, Transportation: Achilles Heel of National Security, 74 POL. SCI. Q. 1 (1959).
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Beyond question, then, government has made a truly important contribution to
development of the superb and highly-refined American transport system. But as
government promotion has also created excessive transport facilities and economic
distortions, this by no means implies that all is well or that the best and most efficient
system has resulted from the combined efforts of government and private enterprise.
Nor does it logically mean that the policies of the past should be continued in-
definitely without change. However, continuing subsidies may be essential to assure
a sufficient and modernized supply of overseas shipping facilities.
When one looks objectively at the problem of the justification for subsidies to
domestic transport, it is clear that all of the historical reasons, excepting political and
pressure-group demands, have disappeared long ago in most cases. Clearly, there
is no present need for land grants or equivalent aid to stimulate an initial develop-
ment of a rail system, although a serious lag in rail investment in terms of moderniza-
tion and additional equipment has long been cause for public concern. Highway
motor transport is now a mature and thriving industry, and principal highway routes
with high-type surfaces have been established throughout the land. Although ex-
panding traffic and congestion in and near cities obviously require much highway ex-
pansion and modernization, plainly there is no longer any need for public subsidies
from general tax funds in order to introduce the advantages of this technique of trans-
port to the American economy. Very likely, most economically-needed highway
development would come as rapidly as can be justified, considered competing needs
for scarce resources and consumers' preferences for all goods and services, on the
basis of effective demand, if user fees and tolls were adjusted appropriately and if
the principle of user support of highways were applied more fully and insistently.
The quick additions to expensive and superior highway supply in congested areas
by the state-owned toll road authorities appear to indicate that the required facilities
would come sooner on that commercial basis of organization than under the existing
so-called free-road policies.
Air transport, too, can no longer be regarded as an infant industry in need of
continuing subsidies to assure its development, except for the somewhat non-
economic case that has been made for subsidizing the local and metropolitan airlines
to give rural areas and urban communities more of the advantages of the air age.
It is noteworthy that the rapid introduction of new technology in air transport did
not cease, or even slacken, nor did rapid growth stop, with cessation of air-mail
subsidies to the significant trunk lines. Witness the 1958-59 introduction of pure jet
transports. Despite a natural disinclination by the airlines to make adjustments to
increased costs when a way can be found to avoid them, it is doubtful that placing
explicit and adequate user fees on the civil airways over a period of time would
seriously impede beneficial innovations in that industry. The great growth of the
traffic of barge lines serving ports on the well-located inland waterways would seem
to indicate that free channel and lock services are no longer essential to intensive
use of such facilities. In the case of marginal waterways, the traffic does not develop
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to high levels even without user fees, a situation that has raised serious questions
about the economic justification made for some waterways and the legislative de-
cisions to invest in them.
Manifestly, the conditions that originally prompted adoption of the particular
subsidy and promotional policies chosen in the pioneering phase of this country's
development and during the early years of the development of each of the transport
industries (except the pipelines) no longer obtain. This does not mean that govern-
ment should withdraw altogether from promotion of transport agencies; rather it
should comprehensively review its historic promotional policies in order to bring
them in line with the present-day needs of commerce, the postal service, and national
defense. Obviously, there is no reason to withdraw from government ownership and
investment in airways, airports, highways, and inland waterways, as these are all
widely-accepted governmental business functions. However, the greatly changed
conditions in transport since the original subsidy policies were initiated, the urgent
need for achieving greater over-all economy in transport, and the many competing
claims for general tax revenues at both federal and state levels logically argue for
the total elimination of subsidies to so-called infant transport industries that clearly
have developed into market and traffic adulthood and have been competing vigor-
ously and successfully with the privately-owned agencies not enjoying continuing
and equalizing subsidies but, in contrast, having to bear both the overhead costs of
way investments and a full load of taxes on their way facilities.
III
Tim EFFECTS OF PUBLIC AIDS UPON THE CURRENT TRANSPORT SITUATION
The beneficial general results of this country's policy of stimulating economic de-
velopment through encouraging adequate and efficient transport and by fostering
technical innovation and competition in transport refer to a long-term historical
period during which all of our modern transport agencies have evolved from the
stage of experimentation and infancy into mature industries. Those gains, along
with tremendous economic wastes from overdeveloped facilities on many routes and
from encouragement of traffic flows over high-cost agencies, 4 have long ago been
achieved. Today, the problem of transport policy is radically different than in the
1830-1930 period. Insufficient attention has been given to this fact in formulating
promotional and regulatory policies in recent years.
The transport problem today and in the foreseeable future is to promote the
right economic development of each of the five contending agencies, including that
of the several classes of carriers and of coordinated services by two or more classes
of carriers. No longer can the primary aim of policy be to foster initial economic
development of the western regions through establishing effective transport supply
1 DEA IUNG & OWEN, oP. ct. suprz note 9, at x3-15; Merton H. Miller, Price Discrimination in the
Railway Industry, 1952 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Johns Hopkins University Library); MEYtER,
PECEK, STENASON, & Zwscx, op. cit. supra note i, chs. VI and VII.
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(except for the new state of Alaska"5), or even to hasten the introduction of new
transport industries by means of temporary or continuing subsidies. This is not to
say that modes of transport now not visualized will never be invented nor appear
on the market horizon. Considering the dynamics of the space age, it is conceivable
that new transport methods, superior to existing ones, are now in the making. How-
ever, the present-day policy-makers, and, indeed, the entire citizenry, currently face
well-defined and critical transport questions growing out of the existing relations
among agencies and carriers, the current promotional and regulatory policies, and
the present structure of transport. Thus, it would seem wholly reasonable to give
priority to such issues, leaving the question of what subsidies may be desirable for
promoting rapid development of any new mode of transport to be dealt with after
someone invents it and it has actually appeared on the scene in tangible form.
The most critical issue in transport today involves what to do about the deterio-
rating postwar condition of the railroads and the multiplying evidence of long-term
railway decline. If the newer agencies, air, highway, pipeline, and barge transport,
are truly superior to the railroads in service and in resource costs, and if, all traffic
needs considered, those modes can completely and efficiently take the place of the
railroads, then the problem would be a simple one of determining the proper rates
of disinvestment in railway facilities and of abandonment of rail services, while
investing sufficiently in other transport to carry the traffic load from which the
railroads would progressively be released. Even so, there would be no economic
reason for subsidizing any of the newer agencies, except in the very early stages of
initial development. On the other hand, if the new agencies cannot substitute com-
pletely or sufficiently for the railroads and cannot give as comprehensive or as low-
cost service as the rail carriers, then the problem is far more difficult, and wholesale
revision of past policies in transport will be essential.
At this point, a resum6 of the well-known facts revealing a long-term decline
in the market position of the railroads is pertinent. The principal facts are as
follows:
i. The railroads' postwar freight traffic has averaged about forty per cent above
the 1926 and 1929 levels, representative years during the last sustained prosperity
era previous to the present one.
2. Notwithstanding, the rail share of total intercity ton-miles has dropped from
seventy-five per cent or more to 46.3 per cent in 1957, while the shares of the
truck lines, barge lines, and pipelines have all risen greatly.
3. Rail ton-miles have not exceeded the 1947 postwar peak in subsequent years,
whereas total intercity ton-miles have risen by a third and the combined intercity
volume carried by competing truckers, barge operators, and pipelines has doubled
since that time.
5 Se ALASKA INTERNATIONAL RAIL AND HIGHwAY COMMISSION, ADDITIONAL TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES
To ALASKA (1959); SUMiMAY OF PRVOUS STUrIS (1957)-
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4. After a phenomenal wartime increase in rail passenger-miles, the passenger
traffic of the railroads has fallen steadily, the 1956 volume being only about four-
fifths as high as the 1926-29 level and the rail share being only 4.09 per cent of
total intercity passenger-miles by all agencies in that year (3.65 per cent in 1957),
compared with twenty-two per cent in 1926.
5. In many transport markets, including those of medium hauls, where much
traffic is concentrated, the railroads have lost so much of the high-rated, profitable
types of traffic that frequently their market shares of specific items of manufactured
and miscellaneous traffic between particular points have been reduced to negligible
percentages, and even to zero in not a few cases.
In brief, while the trucks increased their intercity traffic by more than x5o,ooo,ooo,-
ooo ton-miles since 1947, the pipelines added more than r25,ooo,ooo,ooo ton-miles to
their total, and the barge lines added about 8o,ooooooooo ton-miles to their volume, the
railroads stood still in freight traffic; and much of the most profitable types of traffic,
even transcontinental hauls, shifted away from them. Obviously, the railroads did
not participate in the growth of the postwar economy, while their principal freight
competitors attracted an additional volume in excess of one-half the annual freight
traffic of the railroads in postwar years. Much of the passefiger traffic lost by the
railroads shifted to the airlines. In addition, the private automobiles took away most
of the vast new intercity travel during postwar years, with the airlines commanding
a small share.'0
The revenue, profits, and capital-investment effects of those huge shifts of traffic
from the railroads have been disastrous, except in the case of certain southern and
western roads that enjoyed traffic gains from population and industrial growth and
except for the highly unique Pocahontas coal railroads. Although accounting for the
total revenues or revenue equivalents (operating expenses) of all agencies poses
problems, it is clear from the available data that the aggregate revenues of all car-
riers, including the revenue equivalents of private carriers, have risen during post-
war years as a result of two forces: inflation and traffic growth. Rail revenues, like
those of other agencies, have expanded, but the postwar growth of rail revenues has
not kept up with that of competing agencies. The reasons for these contrasting
trends are that the accretions in rail revenues represent inflation in freight rates only,
whereas the revenue gains of competing agencies represent both higher freight rates
and far larger traffic volumes.
The rail share of the estimated operating revenues of all carriers subject to fed-
eral regulation dropped from 72.1 per cent in 1947 to fifty-six per cent in 1956 (total
revenues expanded from $13,100,000,000 in 1947 to $20,300,000,000 in 1956, while
those of the railroads rose only from $9,5oooo0,ooo to $SI,400,o00,o00). While the
total freight revenues of motor carriers (including the revenue equivalents of private
carriers and of the for-hire groups for which revenues are not reported) rose from
18 NELSON, op. cit. supra note i, chs. 2, 3-
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an estimated level of $1,7oooooooo in 1940 to $13,6oooooooo in 1955, rail freight
revenues increased only from $3,5oooooooo to $8,5oooooooo. Hence, the rail share
of combined motor-rail freight revenues dropped from 674 per cent to 38.7 per cent.
Finally, domestic scheduled airline revenues rose from $55,9ooooo in 1939 to
$1,2o1,1oo,ooo in 1955; in the same period, rail passenger revenues increased only
from $4i7,7ooooo to $743,7ooooo, or by less than a third of the airline gain.17
As might be expected from the traffic and revenue trends cited, the railroads
have been a low-return, "sick" industry during the postwar era. In the same
period, the motor carriers, barge lines, pipelines, and airlines have generally prospered
in terms of rising aggregate net profits and relatively attractive rates of return on net
investment. Direct and indirect subsidies to some of those carriers no doubt con-
tributed to this result. The evidence of the railroads' financial distress, in the form
of low and uneven earnings, is so well known that it need not be presented in
detail here. However, for more than a decade, the rail industry's rates of return on
net investment, with few exceptions, have been at the three to four per cent level,
and the profit situation has been far worse for the Eastern District railroads, where
some of the nation's largest and most important roads, such as the Pennsylvania and
New York Central, operate. As the record of operating deficits during the 1957-58
recession revealed, such low levels of returns are insufficient for important railroads
to establish sufficient reserves to tide them over adverse times without experiencing
the threat of bankruptcy. Rail passenger traffic has declined so seriously that rail-
roads carrying passenger traffic have experienced huge full-cost passenger service
deficits (up to $724,oooooo a year in 1957), and even large and rising deficits (up to
$121,000,000 or more a year) when passenger train revenues are measured against the
solely related expenses, taxes, and rents attributable to the passenger service, accord-
ing to ICC accounting standards. To a considerable but not precisely known degree,
the passenger-service deficits have contributed to the over-all low profitability of the
railroads. An additional fact of material significance is that the low-profit railroads
represent more than one-half of the entire industry, rather than a few marginal rail-
roads.'8
Among general effects that touch the shipping and traveling public are the re-
curring freight car shortages, the lack of sufficient modern freight cars, the dis-
continuance of hundreds of branchline and local mainline passenger trains, the threat
of eventual loss of many or all commuter trains serving the largest metropolitan
centers in the country, the ever-rising freight rates and passenger fares as the rail-
roads have attempted to counter wage and price inflation with higher rates on the
same or lower traffic, retarded capital investment in several areas of railway operation,
and finally, considerable disinvestment in multiple main-line capacity, especially
by the eastern railroads. Excess capacity in basic plant has especially plagued those
roads because of the shift of industry to southern and western regions, the rapid
highway improvement in the Northeast, and the tremendous growth of truck compe-
"' 1d. at 23-29. 18 Id. chs. 7, 9.
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tition in reflection of better highways and the comparatively short distances between
major eastern centers. Only recently have these effects commanded widespread
public discussion. No doubt, the threat of loss of needed commutation and other
rail passenger services has stimulated a general interest in the railroad problem.
Such unsatisfactory conditions have again raised the question whether the ever-
expanding public spending programs and continuing subsidies have discouraged rail-
way progress and increased rail and investor determination to withdraw from un-
profitable services.
But not all effects of the current rail situation are disturbing. After too many
years of hesitation, the railroads have now been stimulated by competition and ad-
versity to inaugurate a program of vigorous competitive rate-making, to offer new
and coordinated services such as hauling trailers on flat cars under several different
plans, and to experiment widely with new types of rates and shipper incentives
designed both to reduce unit costs and attract traffic. In addition, the roads have
been encouraged to find new ways of substituting capital for labor, to modernize
motive power and other facilities as rapidly as financially feasible, and to seek solu-
tions to long-standing labor and regulatory problems.
No doubt, many observers will be inclined to argue that if the railroads will attack
their competitive, modernization, and efficiency problems with sufficient enterprise,
the critical economic situation of the industry will correct itself without any basic
change in public policies. Others will contend that the rail difficulties are wholly due
to desirable technological substitution, rather than to uneconomic displacement re-
flecting the differential advantages of subsidies, public way and terminal tax exemp-
tion, and not having to bear the overhead costs of investment in ways and terminals.
Some will argue that the differential subsidy, tax, and cost-structure advantages
afforded air, highway, and water carriers are too minor, in any event, to be found
responsible for railway decline and its emerging long-term effects.
These varying views merit careful analysis by all concerned with the transport
problem. However, even if the railways have not done all in their power to im-
prove their market position, the correction of such condition would in no way justify
continuation of subsidies to other agencies. And although the rail spokesmen may
have overemphasized the contribution of public aids and subsidies to railway decline
and may have minimized management's role and other factors, a position that
differential aids and subsidies have not been a factor in railway decline would be
untenable. For one thing, such a position overlooks the fact that the effects of
subsidies to competing modes have been cumulative over a long period and prob-
ably are becoming greater each year as a result of expanding public expenditure pro-
grams and the lag in adoption of user fees. While it is not possible to conclude
exactly how much of the rail loss of market and income position has been due
to subsidies and to differential advantages from use of public ways and terminals,
nor to establish how much of that market loss can be attributed to fully economic
technological substitution, the most logical inference seems to be that some material
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loss of rail traffic, revenues, and profitability can be assigned to uneconomic subsidies
and to the other special benefits of public aids.
The view sometimes advanced that the trend toward displacement of the railroads
is not a serious economic problem rests fundamentally on the obvious fact that the
traffic and revenue shifts from the railways have resulted from the choices made by
shippers and travelers in markets for transport services after giving consideration to
the relative advantages of the alternative services and rates available to them, in-
cluding the services and costs of private carriers. But the exercise of shipper and
traveler choice alone is not sufficient to assure an economic distribution of traffic and
allocation of resources in transport. Those results can be assumed to occur through
markets only when all resource and social costs involved in supplying each of the
several types of transport service are covered in the rates quoted to shippers and
travelers (and are included in private carrier costs), and then only when the rates
appropriately reflect the cost of the different services rendered. There are other
conditions essential to an ideal division of traffic and allocation of resources between
transport and other products that need not be detailed here.19
Are all resource and social costs of producing alternative transport services in-
cluded in the rates which shippers and travelers must pay, or in the alternative costs
that must be borne if private transport is chosen? Beyond any doubt, the answer
must be in the negative. Thus, the barge lines, whether operated for-hire or as
private carriers, do not make any direct payments for their use of government-provided
channels, locks, and navigation aids, even to defray such recurring expenses of
operation as for labor, electric energy, and maintenance. Considering the compara-
tively inferior service by water, the cost per ton-mile thereby escaped is sufficient
in relation to bargeline carrier costs to allow barge rates to be enough lower than
they otherwise would be to attract an unknown amount of traffic from other agencies,
principally from the railroads. The less-than-compensatory airport charges and the
lack of fees for use of the federal airways also lower the service costs of air carriers
below what they otherwise would be. However, with air travel over long distances
so superior in speed to surface travel, it is less certain that adding the costs escaped
by the airlines to their fares would materially reduce the volume of long-distance
air travel. Undoubtedly, substantial marginal short-distance travel and some aircoach
business over longer hauls might go by other agencies if all airway and airport costs
reasonably attributable to the airlines were charged and were reflected in air fares;
and the volume of air cargo, because costs and rates are now so high as drastically to
limit traffic, might be reduced somewhat if all airway and airport costs had to be
borne by the airlines.
In the case of the highway carriers, the matter is greatly complicated by the
fact that both automobiles and commercial vehicles have long paid user fees and
large annual amounts toward sustaining the capital and operating costs of the public
19 d. at 187-88; J. R. SARGENT, BmRISH TRANSPORT POLICY ch. I (x958); MEYER, PECY, STENASON, &
Zwicx, op. cit. supra note i, cl. VII.
PUBLic AMns To DOm~sTIc TRANSPORT
highway system. There is no part of that system which is furnished entirely free
of any charge, as in the case of the inland waterways. One view is that motor
vehicles may pay more than the marginal costs of operating the highways, since
state and federal user free systems have raised capital funds in large amounts in
addition to covering operating and maintenance costs-and in some cases, even total
amounts greater than all highway expenditures. According to that view, the
marginal costs of motor carriers may have been raised by highway contributions
to levels higher than are economic and thus not enough economic diversion from
railways to highway carriers has occurred.20 On the other hand, it has many times
been demonstrated that the largest and heaviest vehicles do not pay fully in propor-
tion to their use of the highway plant, for, with the exception of a few states, the
significant diesel-powered trucks and buses do not pay a differential fuel tax to com-
pensate for their higher miles per gallon as compared with gasoline-propelled trucks
and buses. In addition, graduated registration fees are usually not adjusted so that
the high-mileage vehicles must pay proportionately more than the low-mileage ve-
hicles of the same type, and only a comparatively few states have adopted weight-
mile taxation. However, it is a matter of controversy whether the large and heavy
vehicles pay user charges sufficient to bear the full additional investment and main-
tenance costs that their size and frequent heavy axle loads make necessary, although
a good deal of factual information suggests that they may not in many states.2 1
Hence, while highway users as a class do, in large part, support the public ways they
use, there can be no assurance that all subsidies to the truly significant heavy and
long-distance highway carriers have been eliminated.
Even though existing user fees may be adequate to cover the annual costs actually
occasioned in rendering highway services to automobiles and other light vehicles
(and those of other classes of vehicles in some jurisdictions), it cannot be overlooked
that there are other special advantages to the users of public way and terminal facili-
ties that are not available to carriers owning and maintaining their own basic plant
facilities. These arise from the following facts:
i. State and local property taxes are not levied on airways, airports, highways,
and inland waterways, whereas they are levied on the road and track facilities of
the railroads and on the pipelines.
2. Capital funds are often available for public investment in ways and termi-
nals at lower interest cost than are funds for investment in private facilities, re-
flecting the income tax-exempt status of state and local bonds and the added se-
curity of the taxing power behind many government bonds.
3. Air, motor, and water carriers are spared the necessity of raising capital
funds for construction of public way and terminal facilities, and of bearing the
fixed costs attributable to provision of airways, airports, highways, and waterways.
20 Miller, supra note 14, at 371-72.
"1 See references to federal and state highway user-fee studies in Tallamy, First Progress Report of
the Highway Cost Allocation Study, H.R. Doc. No. io6, 85 th Cong., ist Sess. 126-31 (1957).
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User fees for highways and" airports do not include property tax amounts equal
to the state and local taxes that would have been levied on those facilities if they had
been in private ownership. Estimated property taxes on the line facilities of the rail-
roads amount to more than $200,000,000 a year 2  If user fees are to make shipper
and traveler choice truly effective in selecting the most efficient transport alternative,
they should include property tax equivalents with respect to public ways and termi-
nals 3
It is true that motor-vehicle owners, including motor carriers, pay general excise
taxes to the federal government on motor vehicles and parts. However, since passage
of the Highway Revenue Act of 1956,' converting a portion of those taxes into federal
highway user fees and all federal excise taxes on motor fuels, tires, and tubes into pay-
ments for federal-aid highways, the aggregate annual amounts of such general tax
contributions have been lessened 2 To ascertain whether the remaining general
excise taxes equalize the cost situation as between highway carriers and the railroads
would require a comprehensive factual study.28 In the case of airways, the two-
cent excise tax on aviation gasoline (after refunds) cannot be considered both a
partial payment toward the annual user costs of airway services, as contended by the
airlines, and also a general tax in lieu of property taxes on those public facilities.
Inland waterway carriers do not pay federal excise taxes on motor fuels. However,
all types of carriers pay applicable property taxes on privately-owned equipment and
terminal facilities; and if net income is earned, all privately-owned carriers pay fed-
eral income taxes.2 Notwithstanding, the costs of carriers using public way and
terminal facilities do not include all the tax elements of cost with which privately-
owned carriers are assessed recurrently.
Interest on capital funds invested in public transport facilities is included in
the costs to be covered by user revenues only to the extent, and at the rates, actually
paid. Although tolls for the services of modern toll roads and highway user fees
include charges to recover interest actually paid on borrowed funds, it is doubtful
that existing user fees for highways and airports have generally included interest at its
full social-cost level-that is, at the marginal rate which the capital funds might have
earned in alternative private investments. However, in extending public investment
in way and terminal facilities, the total costs to be justified by the benefits should
include interest on the capital to be employed at the full social costs of government
financing, rather than at the lower interest rates at which money can often be
"
2 NELSON, op. cit. supra note I, at xo9. In 1956, Class I railroads paid estimated property taxes on
way facilities of $213,700,000, or 2% of the $so,551,ooo,ooo of total operating revenues for that year.
"ROLAND N. McKEAN, EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT THROUGH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 163-65, 205, 242
(1958).; Board of Investigation and Research, A Report on Carrier Taxation, H.R. Doc. No. 16o, 79th
Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1945).
" INr. REV. CODE OF X954, § 4041 et seq. "Tallamy, supra note 21, at 27-37.
8 Such as the report, directed by Dr. Ronald B. Welch, comparing carrier tax payments in 1940.
Board of Investigation and Research, A Report on Carrier Taxation, H.R. Doc. No. x6o, 7 9 th Cong.,
ist Sess. (1945).
27For a summary statement of exemptionis and the differential extent of such taxation as of 1940, see
id. at 21-50.
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borrowed by government agencies or at a zero interest rate if the funds are ob-
tained from taxation. Only when the benefits of a public project are sufficient to
cover all costs, including interest at as high a rate as the capital could earn in other
employments, can it be assumed that there is greater economy in expanding trans-
port dependent on public facilities than in permitting the traffic to be carried by the
privately-owned carriers operating on private ways, enlarging their capacity for that
purpose if necessary.28 And in the cases in which public way and terminal invest-
ment prove to be well-adjusted to the demand for them, economic neutrality would
require that the user fees charged for their use should include interest at a rate equal
to the full social cost of government financing.
Neither in public investment decisions nor in the pricing of public transport
facilities has much consideration been given to the social costs attributable to air and
highway transport. On the highways, the additional risks of fatal accidents and the
extra time and money costs of congestion and inability to pass on hills are frequent
social costs forced on automobile owners by the large trucks and buses. The expand-
ing use of automobiles, for which the streets and parking facilities are grossly in-
adequate, has been an important factor in making public transit and commutation
facilities unprofitable and investment in modernized rapid transit facilities unattrac-
tive to private investors. Automobile travel has thus contributed to high-cost and
inadequate transit and commutation service for the millions of urban people not
owning passenger cars in metropolitan communities where passenger cars cannot
physically meet the peak home-to-work travel demands.29 But in only a few cases
are any of those social costs imposed on the highway users specifically responsible
for them. Nor is the social cost of the noise of airplanes fully placed on the airlines
and their customers. Of course, the railroads and the transit lines also have created
some serious social costs (noise, smoke, and slum dwellings) that the firms and their
customers largely escaped in the past, although dieselization of railway motive power
has almost eliminated the smoke and soot nuisance of coal-powered steam loco-
motives. No doubt, the real marginal costs of highway use rise automatically for
all motorists and commercial carriers as congestion becomes intense; but this does
not necessarily assess the social costs of congestion against the proper classes of
motor vehicles, and it does nothing to relieve non-motor-vehicle owners of motor
vehicle noise and exhaust fumes nor to compensate them for the deleterious effects
of those conditions on health, happiness, and property values.
The points can be made that such social costs are intangible and hard to measure
in specific terms, and that in any case, it has not been customary to require private
firms and individuals to bear the social costs of their activities along with the
money costs priced out to them in the markets for economic goods and the factors of
2 The opportunity cost of capital for public projects raised by federal taxation was found to be on the
order of 5-6%, accepting private time preference, in OTTO ECKsrEmN, ,VATER-RESOURCE DEvELo PmENT
81-104 (1958); and JOHN V. KuTILLA, & OrrTo ECICSTIN, MULTIPLE POUP0SE RIvER DEVELOPMENT 78-
127 (1958).
2 VsIFR.F. OWEN, THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM 137-41i 253-54 (1956).
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production. While those points are largely true, this does not mean that social
costs should be ignored where such costs are substantial and traceable. It may be
noted that both public and private power companies are required to construct and
pay the full social costs of installing fishways when power dams are placed across
rivers. At all events, where there are uncompensated social costs that may be
contributing to the decline of much-needed and economical systems of transport for
which complete alternatives do not exist, the problem should be looked into more
seriously than in the past. The social disadvantages of rapid expansion of public
transport facilities and the attendant encouragement of further diversion of traffic
to carriers using public ways from agencies they cannot fully replace should be
carefully considered along with the benefits to be derived from that source. At the
minimum, uncompensated social costs provide another reason for limiting capital
investment in public transport facilities to those amounts and cases for which the
economic justification is clear-cut, and for adopting appropriate user fees and tolls
for use of all public transport facilities.
As heretofore noted, the carriers using public way and terminal facilities escape
the fixed-cost burden of owning their own ways and terminals as well as the neces-
sity of having to raise the capital from private markets for expanding and modernizing
those facilities. As a consequence, those carriers can adjust their investment much more
closely to changes in traffic demand than can the privately-owned railroads. In addi-
tion, carriers using public facilities, especially the motor carriers, are much more
flexible in their entry into the best markets for traffic and in their ability to curtail
or abandon service as it becomes relatively or absolutely unprofitable. Such ad-
vantages, due in large part to organizational arrangements in air, motor, and water
transport, could be extended the railroads by government ownership of the rail track
facilities, with the privately-owned rail carriers paying user fees for their use. An-
other solution might be to allow the railroads also to operate airplanes, motor vehicles,
and barges over public facilities to the extent such operations may be more profitable
than operating trains; but this alternative might mean that some of the advantages
of rail operations would be neglected, and, unless controlled according to antitrust
law standards, this might again tend to create obnoxious monopoly power in trans-
port.
When consideration is given to the complete lack of user fees in some areas, the
questions that can be raised concerning the adequacy of user fees now charged high-
way and air carriers, the tax exemptions, interest-cost, and investment advantages
accruing to carriers dependent on public way and terminal facilities, and the extent
to which carrier rates diverge from costs of service, it cannot be concluded that the
division-of-traffic trends in transport have been fully economic in the past, even
though they have reflected the deliberate choices of shippers and travelers. Thus,
it is quite likely that public expenditures and subsidies have influenced more traffic
to move by the agencies using public facilities and receiving subsidies than otherwise
would have moved over them. Accordingly, the logical possibilities all point to the
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conclusion that subsidies and the differential advantages of public facilities have been
factors in long-term railway deterioration and decline.
IV
THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC AIDS ON CAPITAL FowRATiON IN TRANSPORT
Transport has long been a field in which technological change and capital invest-
ment have contributed greatly to cost reductions and product improvements. Both
private and public investment have been important in bringing about rapid transport
modernization, once new or improved motive power, carrying equipment, terminal
devices, and way facilities had been invented and adapted for actual operations.
All factors point to the expectation that capital investment will continue to be tre-
mendously important in transport progress.
But under the conditions that obtain in transport today, can it confidently be ex-
pected that the full dynamic technological and modernization possibilities will be
achieved in all fields of transport important to the economy? This question has
not been accorded the attention it merits in the formulation of public policy, for it
has generally been assumed by the policy-makers that the privately-owned agencies,
dependent almost wholly on their earnings and the private capital markets for capital
funds, can somehow attract the funds needed to develop fully all cost-reducing and
service-improving innovations that come along and to supply adequate facilities for
the needs of commerce. However, this easy assumption, made by the policy-makers
as recently as during enactment of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,30 seems
not only unwarranted on the basis of current trends in transport, but also likely to
lead to tragic consequences if not corrected before longY'
Inadequate capital investment is found mainly in the privately-owned sector of
transport, particularly in the railway and transit industries 2 This is because the
appropriation of capital funds for airways, airports, highways, and inland waterways
is decided by political processes in both the federal and state areas; because capital
funds for those facilities are not entirely limited by the earnings possibilities from
their use on the basis of user charges; and because government can, and has, used
the taxing power, as well as its superior credit, to raise capital funds for investment
in public transport facilities. Not to be overlooked is the influence of widely-held
political theories concerning the responsibility of the government for increasing public
expenditures, even with deficit financing, to bring about full employment and to
counter income-reducing forces in time of recession or depression. To the extent
that government investments are expanded for those purposes, public transport pro-
grams become eligible for expansion and can be enlarged far beyond the limits im-
posed by traffic needs and over-all transport economy. A recent example is the ex-
so 70 Stat. 374. "1 See H-arbeson, supra note 13, at 3-19.
" Adequate capital funds have been available for development and modernization of the privately-
owned oil and gas pipelines according to the needs of the market, since those facilities have been integrated
with the profitable oil-refining industry, pipeline unit costs have been relatively low, and the volume-
of oil and gas traffic has grown rapidly.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
panded rate of federal highway investment authorized by the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1958 1 without raising user fees to pay the additional costs. As already
pointed out, the airlines can also count on, receiving significant indirect technological
benefits from public investments in applied and pure science in behalf of national
security. On the other hand, except for the temporary extensions of government
credit when the railroads have been in serious financial straits as during the de-
pression (RFC loans) and the 1957-58 recession (government guarantees of loans, as
authorized by the Transportation Act of 1958), and the rapid amortization for tax
purposes available to all defense-important industries during recent wars and periods
of national emergency,34 the privately-owned railroads and pipelines have no com-
parable political forces bringing about the appropriation of vast capital funds for
expansion, replacement, and modernization of their ways and terminals.
Both the vast magnitudes of current public investment in transport facilities in
contrast to that in the railroad industry and the rapid expansion of the former as
compared with the latter suggest that a real danger exists that insufficient capital
may be going into the railways, which still carry almost half of the country's intercity
ton-miles and about a third of the intercity travel by common carriers. According
to the Bureau of Public Roads, the estimated annual level of capital expenditures by
all government units on the federal-aid and other highway systems increased from
$4,997,000,000 in 1956 to $7,138,000,000 in 1959, or by more than $2,ooo,ooo,oo. Esti-
mated capital expenditures on the Interstate System, the system most competitive with
the railways, rose from $1,282,000,000 in 1956 to $2,844,ooo,ooo in 1959, or by more
than $1,50o,ooo,o"o5 The tremendous increase in annual investment in the key
highways was greater than the average annual gross investment, including that in
motive power and car equipment, of $i,ioooooooo in the railways during x946-55,8O
It contrasts greatly with the sharp downturn in railway gross investment in 1958 and
1959, reflecting the reduced traffic, revenues, and profits occasioned by the recent
recession.37
Without raising the logical question whether the huge and rising magnitudes of
highway investment portend overinvestment in highways, it takes no prophet to
foresee the ultimate outcome of rapid expansion and modernization of highway
facilities, while railway investment, particularly in roadway facilities (only $329,400,-
ooo per year during 1946-55) lags far behind. This can only mean that railways cannot
make the maximum progress of which their technology is capable. It also suggests
that the freight car supply will continue to be inadequate and that modernization of
freight cars will not occur as quickly as would be desirable. It will take the greatest
managerial ingenuity in competitive pricing, in service improvement, and in other
33 72 Stat. 885, 23 U.S.C.A. §§ IOo-3I (Supp. i958).
"N.soN, op. cit. supra note z, at 2o. Effective Oct. x, x959, through June g6i, the federal
motor fuels tax was raised from 30 to 40 per gallon for highway purposes.
" U. S. Bureau of Public Roads, Dep't of Commerce, Release, Estimate of Receipts and Disbursements
for Highways, 1956-59, Jan. x6, 1959.
" Nr.LsoN, op. cit. supra note i, at 384. See Railway Age, May 18, 1959, pp. 16-X7.
"'Transport Economics, Dec. 1958, pp. i-2; id., March 1959, pp. 1-2.
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areas to compensate for inadequate capital formation by the railroads when invest-
ment in public transport facilities constantly expands.
In his recent study of railway capital needs, John W. Barriger has estimated that
railroad investment should be doubled-to an average annual level of $2,ooo,ooo,oo
at i954_ prices. 38 Furthermore, Barriger contends that the greater part of that ex-
panded annual total should go into roadway improvements that would enhance the
speed of rail service and bring about substantial unit cost reductions. The view that
the railroads have been unable to invest sufficient capital funds in the postwar period
to achieve the modernization that experience has proved feasible is widely held
among rail managements and transport specialists, including many shipper repre-
sentatives who desire an adequate supply of modern freight cars, improved service,
and the relief from ever-rising freight rates in an inflationary economy that can be
achieved only by the maximum cost reductions of which rail technology is capable.
It is common knowledge among students of the railroads that capital for railway in-
vestment has been so short that many railroads can finance only the top high-return
investments on their investment priority schedules. While highway investment also
lagged during World War II and the rapid postwar expansion of motor-vehicle
ownership and travel has created many highway bottlenecks, it is doubtful that the
policy-makers, in deciding to raise the annual level of highway investment, made any
specific comparisons to ascertain whether another billion dollars invested in transport
could earn a higher rate of return (and thus yield greater economic benefits for
society) in interstate highways on the one hand, or in interstate railways on the
other. Manifestly, although highway traffic has been rising while rail traffic has
been stable (freight) or falling (passenger), the institutional conditions of invest-
ment have been highly favorable to large-scale highway investments for improving
motor transport service and lowering its costs, and have been equally unfavorable
to higher levels of rail investment for exploring the cost and service gains that might
also be achieved in that field. There is a very real possibility that the expanded
public expenditures on highways may lead to overinvestment in that field and to
underinvestment in the railroads. Even if the former possibility does not eventuate,
however, the latter will deny society the full measure of transport progress unless
policy changes more favorable to balanced investment in transport are adopted.
Government investment in the inland waterways and in airways and airports has
also expanded materially in recent years. For example, the Corps of Engineers re-
ported rivers and harbor expenditures for navigation in fiscal 1953 of $183,400,000 for
capital construction and $88,8ooooo for maintenance, or a total of $272,2oo,ooo for all
purposes. These levels compare with $28,300,000, $60,900,000, and $89,200,ooo,
respectively, in fiscal 1947. And an additional $6,900,000,000 of federal funds will be
required to complete the federal program authorized for navigation (including
multiple-purpose projects) through fiscal 1957. Federal appropriations for the rivers-
and-harbors program amounted to $4,2oooooooo through fiscal 1954, after adjusting
as JOHN W. BAMGER, SuPR-Rio ~OADs FOR A DYNAMIC AMCAN ECONOmY 7 (1956).
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for those portions of the cost of multiple-purpose projects that are assignable to non-
navigational purposes. Total federal airway expenditures have risen from $70,900,000
in fiscal 1950 to $152,400,000 in fiscal 1957, of which those for cost of establishment
rose from $r7,5ooooo to $56,900,000. Under a recent revision of the Federal Airway
Plan, federal airway expenditures are scheduled to more than double between fiscal
1957 and fiscal 1962. Federal aid to airport construction, which ranged between
$5,i0o,ooo and $33,200,000 during fiscal years 1948-57, was authorized to rise to
.$63,ooo,ooo a year in subsequent years under the 1955, amendment of the Federal Air-
port ActO9 That level is more than double the average annual appropriations under
the 1946 Act 4
Hence, under the political and economic pressures that insistently manifest them-
selves in the Congress, the investment programs for highways, inland waterways, and
air facilities have been greatly increased in recent years. Unless such investment is
tied more closely than in the past to the economic limits that would be imposed
under complete user-fee financing and under economic criteria that would necessitate
systematic consideration of the relative investment opportunities in all fields of
transport, there will be no reversal of this trend in the future. In all likelihood, it
will continue to be difficult, if not impossible, for the privately-owned railroads to
expand their annual investment as much as technological opportunities warrant.
Whatever these prospects mean in terms of improved air, motor, and water service
and reduced carrier costs in those fields, they plainly endanger achieving, in addition,
the maximum gains that appear possible from greater investment in the railroads.
Indeed, they may well yield smaller benefits per dollar invested in transport facilities
than might be obtained under a more balanced investment program for transport as
a whole.
The recurrent car shortages, the highly disturbing commutation service dis-
continuances, and the vulnerability of important railroads to bankruptcy in time
of modest recession all suggest that one effect of public expenditures on highways, air
facilities, and waterways has been to discourage investment in the railroads. With
low profitability prevailing for many years, the railroads cannot attract capital from
the outside, except for equipment, and cannot greatly increase their investment from
retained earnings. Since public investment and continuing subsidies in some trans-
port fields have been factors in diversion of traffic and revenues from the railways,
it must be concluded, too, that they have also contributed to limiting the investment
levels in that industry. Low profitability in the rail industry, influenced in part by
subsidies, discourages private investment; but political demands bring about more
investment in the basic facilities for competing agencies, whether or not such invest-
ment is shown to be self-liquidating or must meet market tests of its worth.
1169 Stat. 441, 49 U.S.C. §§ IrOX-1 (Supp. V, 1958).
,o 6o Star. 170, 49 U.S.C. § 1101-19 (1952). See NLSON, op. Ai. supra note i, at 85-88, 97-98,
100-03.
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A PUBLIC AiDs POLICY FOR THE FUTURE
The historic public policy of fostering transport innovations and development has
been an important factor in stimulating the high productivity of the American econ-
omy by increasing the division of labor, the geographical specialization in industry,
the volume of trade, and the economies in large-scale production. Along with private
enterprise in the private sectors of transport, it has also contributed the most highly-
developed, diverse, and efficient transport system in the world. By encouraging rapid
use of new techniques of transport, it has greatly enriched social life and increased
communication among people in a variety of ways.
It cannot be denied that initial subsidies to hasten the introduction of infant
transport industries have contributed to early achievement of the important gains
from improved transport. However, the original purposes for the historic subsidy
programs have largely, if not completely, been accomplished, and in recent decades,
the transport problem has substantially changed character. From stimulating an
initial supply of efficient transport to develop the vast land resources of this country
and from encouraging a more rapid introduction of a succession of new agencies
than the market alone would have brought about, the national transport problem
has changed to one of facilitating the right economic development of each mode of
transport, including essential public way and terminal facilities. A solution to that
problem must be found both to prevent an already tolerably adequate system from
breaking down in essential areas and to minimize transport costs by eliminating
wasteful investment and the costly practice of encouraging traffic to move over high-
cost rather than low-cost agencies.
As government, for good reasons, owns, manages, and finances airways, airports,
highways, and inland waterways, there obviously remains a public need for con-
tinuing government investment in those facilities more or less indefinitely. While
there is thus a permanent case for efficient public investment programs in transport
and possibly one for public investment in rail roadway facilities to equalize the
conditions of investment other than by adoption of universal user fees, no economic
case can be made for a continuing program of subsidies in addition to the efficient
public investment that the mixed system of transport makes necessary. As originally
conceived, most subsidy programs for domestic transport had concrete national de-
velopment objectives. These have largely or wholly been achieved. Present-day
subsidies to domestic transport are designed for the special advantage of particular
regions, industries, transport firms, and users, rather than for greater transport
efficiency as a whole and for elevating the productivity of the entire economy to
the maximum extent.
By relieving the carriers enjoying subsidies along with public facilities of some
of the resource costs of producing their transport services, transport subsidies lower
the cost of operation of such carriers. They thereby enable these carriers to quote
lower rates than otherwise would be the case Since their rates do not include all
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economic costs, it is often impossible for shippers and travelers to select the agency
and carriers economically best fitted to render the service demanded. The inevitable
result is that traffic tends to be diverted from agencies and carriers having lower
resource costs than the subsidized carriers. In turn, this means that traffic tends to
be induced to flow over high-cost rather than low-cost agencies. Although other
factors have also influenced much diversion from the railroads in recent years, there
can be no doubt that a part of that traffic diversion has been uneconomic4
Moreover, since traffic and revenue diversion from the railroads has been increased
by subsidies to competing modes, it follows that continuing subsidies have been a
factor in the railroads' deteriorating postwar condition. The tax and cost-of-capital
advantages to carriers using public ways and terminals have further contributed to
low rail earnings and to underinvestment in rail plant. Finally, the far greater avail-
ability of capital funds for airway, airport, highway, and waterway expansion and
modernization, the result of powerful political pressures for public investment, as
well as the induced expanding traffic volumes carried by those facilities, has tipped
the scales further in favor of rapid technological advances in air, motor, and water
transport. Meanwhile, modernization lags in the rail industry, and equipment and
motive power are often inadequate to handle present traffic. Clearly, if nothing is
done to eliminate unnecessary subsidies and to encourage a greater flow of capital
into that industry as well as into competing agencies, the country will be taking
grave risks of losing essential and self-sustaining rail services and plant that even
now are needed to transport the traffic load efficiently and may again be more urgently
required when traffic is at wartime peaks. It, therefore, seems foolhardy for the
nation to ignore this situation when the evidence logically points to subsidies and
unbalanced transport investment as factors in the disturbing condition of the railroads.
The means are at hand for correction of those deleterious influences in behalf of the
public welfare as a whole.
The first step that should be taken is to enact a policy of user fees for all agencies
using public way and terminal facilities. As the chief gaps in user fees are the lack
of explicit charges for use of the civil airways and the inland waterways, only federal
action is required. The Civil Aeronautics Administration has made several studies
of user charges for the airways and has found them feasible4 Programs of airway
user fees have been recommended to the Congress by President Eisenhower, and in
1957, the Department of Commerce was directed to study the feasibility of tolls for
use of waterway channels and locks.43 As the Department of Commerce report
should be issued in the near future, there should be no significant technical difficulties
"lid. ch. io.
12 CAA, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A PROGRAM OF CHARGES FOR TE USE OF THE FEDERAL AIRWAYS
SYSTEM 121-31 (1953); id. at 6-7 (Supp. No. I, 1954). Cf. MEYER, PECK, STEX'ASON, & ZWICK, op.
cit. supra note I, at 139-44.
"See the Budget Message of the President, in THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEAR
1959, at M3o-3i (1958); id., FISCAL YEAR I96O, at M4 7-5o (1959); the BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, BULL.
No. 58-3, USER CHARGES FOR CERTAIN GOVERNMENT SERVICES (957); Dep't of Commerce Release No.
G-85o, Nov. 27, 1957. Cf. MEYER, PECK, STENASON, & ZWICK, op. cit. supra note x, at 122-26, 148.
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in the way of prompt legislation to enact user fees for the airways and waterways.
On the other hand, such proposals will encounter stout political opposition from the
transport industries involved and from communities that differentially benefit from
subsidies. Eventually, however, national concern over the prospect of inadequate
rail transport, the need for greater economy in transport as a whole, and the
pressure of other claimants for general federal funds will offset the opposition of the
pressure groups benefiting from subsidized transport.
After the gaps in the user-fee picture have been closed, the next logical step
will be to adjust existing user-fee systems more in accordance with economic pricing
of public way and terminal facilities as rapidly as that may be possible. Such an
effort will involve the states as well as the federal government; and because of the
unsettled state of knowledge concerning the behavior of highway costs, some real
difficulties will be encountered."
The adoption of federal highway user fees for the first time in 1956 represented
significant progress. However, refinement of the predominant state pattern of
highway user fees (uniform fuel taxes and graduated registration fees without mileage
components) adopted at that time to pay for federal-aid highways was left until
January 3, i961. By that date, the Bureau of Public Roads must complete a compre-
hensive series of studies designed to ascertain how highway costs are affected by the
size and weight of motor vehicles as well as by their mileages of use. The Bureau
will also report to the Congress on other factors that might be taken into considera-
don in adjusting the federal highway user fees in terms of economy and equity 5
If the Congress eventually improves the present federal user-fee structure by adopting
a diesel differential in the fuels tax and in other ways that the evidence may support,
it can be expected that the states would rapidly accept the federal leadership and
adjust their highway user fees accordingly. Though a distinct opportunity was
missed in 1956 to make some much-needed improvements in the highway user-fee
structure, it is far from too late to remedy the situation. A few states have long
ago attacked some of the outstanding structural defects of highway user-fee schedules
by adopting diesel fuel tax differentials and weight-mile schedules, and in many states,
voluminous research has been done on highway pricing. Although the earlier Mary-
land and Idaho test roads were disappointing because they were not designed to
throw specific light on the additional highway service costs caused by the large and
heavy vehicles, the current ASSHO road test in Illinois should shed much light on
that critical question. In the case of user fees for airways and waterways, effort
should be made to adopt economic schedules in the beginning, allowing them to take
effect gradually over a period of years if desirable to lighten the burden of adjust-
"' See ROBERT F. BAxmR, ROBERT CmEmuzzr, & RIcIARD W. BLETZACI:ER, HIOHWAY CosTs AND TEnR
RELATIONSHIP To VEMCLE SIZE (The Ohio State University, Engineering Experiment Station Bull. No.
168, 1958).
'
5 Tallamy, supra note 21, at 1-6. See also Kafoglis, Price Theory and Tax Equity in Highway
Finance, paper delivered before the Annual Meeting of the Highway Research Board, Jan. X959, pp. 2-12.
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ment by the carriers to having to pay fully for government-provided way and termi-
nal services.
Finally, a number of other policies require modification, and the railroads must
do far more in their own behalf by engaging in effective competitive pricing on the
basis of their own unit costs by making rapid service innovations, by dealing vig-
orously with their labor problems, and by directing their investments into channels
that will bring the greatest returns! 6 Although the subject is beyond the scope of
this article, there is also an urgent need to modify the current transport regulatory
policies to permit all agencies to make their inherent advantages of cost and service
effective in the market place and to lessen the drags and costs of excessive regulation
of an essentially competitive transport system. Without this, the railroads cannot
effectively solve their outstanding problems; nor can the present uneconomic market
stimuli to overexpansion of certain fields of transport be avoided.
There is an urgent need, too, for more coordination in government planning with
respect to the investment schedules for public transport facilities. First, a Depart-
ment of Transportation is essential in order to provide facilities for supervision and
checking of all investment needs estimates and for comprehensive and continuous
research into the economic effects of federal transport policy.47  Second, uniform
economic criteria should be developed for justifying specific projects in any field of
public transport, including consideration of the social costs of federal financing, tax
effects, and the investment opportunities in privately-owned areas of transport as
well as the several fields of publicly-owned transport. Much useful work has been
done in recent years, both within the federal government and by academic economists,
on the investment criteria problem, including some critical evaluations of the errors
and exaggerations involved in the economic justifications prepared by various federal
agencies!"
In conclusion, entirely too much of the nation's capital is involved in public
transport investments and too much is at stake in terms of the future of the
privately-owned railroads to make it sensible to continue the past separate considera-
tion of the investment needs in each area of public transport. The techniques and
much of the knowledge required for developing economic and coordinated public
transport investment programs are at hand. In addition, it should be recognized
that no public need now exists for continuing subsidies to domestic transport via
failure to consider all resource costs in expanding public transport facilities or failure
to charge user fees for all agencies using such facilities.
"ONELSoN, op. cit. supra note x, at 419-27 and chs. 8-11.
17 See Mackie, The Necessity for a Federal Department of Transportation, 8 J. Pt. L. x (1959).
"8 See, e.g., OTTo ECxSTErN, WATER REsotmcE DEVELOPMENT ch. VI (1958); EDWARD F. RENmAw,
TOWARD RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT ch. V (1957); CECIL B. HAVER & EDWARD F. RENSHAW, THE FUTURE
OF THE ILLINOIS WATERWAY 1-3 (1957)-
